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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF VI Ml

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Petitioner,
Case No. 20010551-SC
v.
BRENT MAUCHLEY,
Defendant/Appellant.

REPLY BRIEF OF PETITIONER

ARGUMENT
THERE IS A DISTINCT TREND TOWARDS
TRUSTWORTHINESS STANDARD
Defendant claims that the trend towards the trustworthiness standard has little
momentum because some of the jurisdictions that have adopted the standard still require
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defendant's claim, however Jurisdictions that apply the trustworthiness standard do not
continue to require independent evidence of a crime.
For example, in State ^ > Hafford, / 46 i \ 2d 150, 1 73 (Conn. 2000),, the Connecticut
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independent of the statements, to establish the corpus delicti." Connecticut follows the
trustworthiness standard because it "eliminate^] the complexities and difficulties

attendant upon the application of the corpus delicti rule requiring independent
corroborating evidence of all the elements of a crime before an accused's statements may
be admitted into evidence." Id. at 174. The prosecution in Hafford had introduced some
independent evidence that the defendant sexually assaulted the victim. Id. at 174. This
evidence corroborated, and therefore "supported] the trustworthiness of the defendant's
confession." Id. Independent evidence of the crime, if available, will often demonstrate
the trustworthiness of the confession. See id. Nevertheless, independent evidence of the
corpus delicti is not required before a trustworthy confession can be admitted. Id. at 173.
Likewise, in State v. Zysk, 465 A.2d 480, 484 (N.H. 1983), the New Hampshire
Supreme Court held that "[p]roof of the crime by evidence independent of the confession
is not necessary," although the prosecution had introduced evidence to show that a
burglary occurred. Similarly, in Reynolds v. State, 309 S.E.2d 867, 868 (Ga. Ct. App.
1983), the prosecution produced independent evidence of the crime. Nevertheless, that
evidence was not necessary because the rule in Georgia is that a confession is admissible
when it is "corroborated] in any material particular." Id.
Defendant claims that the Ninth and Tenth Circuits also require the prosecution to
demonstrate that a crime has occurred before a confession is admissible. Br. of Resp. at
17-18. The rule in the federal courts, however, was announced by the United States
Supreme Court in Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. 84, 93 (1954). That rule rejects the
requirement that independent evidence establish the corpus delicti before a confession can
be admitted. Id. The Tenth Circuit has recognized that "Opper rejected a view which had
2

earlier been the rule in many jurisdiction and was deeply rooted in the common law that
independent evidence was required to corroborate the corpus delicti." United States v.
Wiseman, 172 F.3d 1196, 1212 (10th Cir. 1999). The Ninth Circuit has also recognized
that "Opper 'rejected the traditional corpus delicti rule.'" United States v. CoronaGarcia, 210 F.3d 973, 978 (9th Cir. 2000).
Following the United States Supreme Court's ruling in Opper, at least sixteen
states, plus the District of Columbia, have adopted some form of the trustworthiness
standard. Br. of Pet. at 8-11. Of these seventeen jurisdictions, at least twelve of them
have completely abandoned the corpus delicti rule and do not require independent proof
that a crime was committed. Id. at 8-10.1 There is also additional evidence, beyond that
cited in the State's opening brief, of the trend towards the trustworthiness standard. For
example, although Florida follows the corpus delicti rule, two judges of the Florida
District Court of Appeal recently urged the Florida Supreme Court to abandon the corpus
delicti rule and adopt the trustworthiness standard in attempt and conspiracy cases.
Carwise v. State, No. 5D00-2828, 2002 WL 312513, at *1 - *3 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002)
(Harris, J., concurring specially; Sharp, W., J., dissenting). The court also noted in

1

In its opening brief the State classified Texas as completely abandoning the
corpus delicti rule. However, in Chavero v. State, 36 S.W.3d 688, 696 (Tex. Ct. App.
2001), the Texas Court of Appeals applied the corpus delicti rule. Nevertheless, under
Texas statute a defendant's oral statement is admissible if, at the time it was made, it
"contained assertions unknown by law enforcement but later corroborated." Moore v.
State, 999 S.W.2d 385, 400 (Tex. Ct. App. 1999). Thus, while Texas may not have
completely abandoned the corpus delicti rule, it has embraced some aspects of the
trustworthiness approach by statute.
3

Carwise that the Florida Legislature had recently adopted the trustworthiness standard for
cases involving sexual abuse and unauthorized money transmission. Id. at *3 n.2; FLA.
STAT. ANN.

§§ 92.565 and 560.125(8) (West 2002). Accordingly, there is a distinct trend

toward the trustworthiness standard and away from the corpus delicti rule.
II.

THE TRUSTWORTHINESS STANDARD PROVIDES THE
BETTER METHOD FOR DETERMINING THE
RELIABILITY OF CONFESSIONS AND ENHANCING THE
TRUTHFINDING PURPOSE OF CRIMINAL TRIALS

Defendant touts the corpus delicti rule as a safeguard to prevent the admission of
false confessions. Br. of Resp. at 12-15. He overestimates the rule's utility, however.
The corpus delicti rule is not an effective safeguard against false confessions
because it judges the admissibility of a confession without regard for the substance of the
confession. See People v. McMahan, 548 N.W.2d 199, 206 (Mich. 1996) (Boyle, J.,
dissenting). Rather than evaluating the confession itself, the rule requires only that the
prosecution establish independent evidence that a crime was committed by someone.
State v. Johnson, 821 P.2d 1150, 1162 (Utah 1991).
By ignoring the substance of the confession, the corpus delicti rule does little to
prevent the admission of false confessions. It is not difficult to imagine a scenario where
the police have independent evidence of a crime, and yet obtain a false, but voluntary
confession from an innocent individual. It is also conceivable that a dishonest police
officer, a self-interested accomplice, or a malicious enemy might seek to frame an
innocent defendant by fabricating a story that the defendant confessed to committing an
actual crime. See McMahan, 548 N.W.2d at 207 n. 11. The corpus delicti rule would
4

allow these false confessions to be admitted without regard for their reliability, simply
because independent evidence of the crime existed. See Johnson, 821 P.2d at 1162.
Conversely, the trustworthiness approach puts the substance of the confession
squarely at issue and ensures that a particular statement is sufficiently reliable for the
factfinder to hear it. See McMahan, 548 N.W.2d at 206. The trustworthiness approach
requires the prosecution to introduce "substantial independent evidence" to corroborate
"the essential facts admitted sufficiently to justify a jury inference of their truth." Opper,
348 U.S. at 93. If the goal is to prevent the admission of false confessions, the more
effective approach is to examine the trustworthiness of the confession, not simply
whether independent evidence demonstrates that someone committed a crime. Thus, the
trustworthiness approach provides the better method for preventing the admission of false
confessions because it ensures that a confession is reliable before it is admitted.
The United States Supreme Court has recognized the superiority of the
trustworthiness standard as a means to determine the reliability and admissibility of
confessions. See Smith v. United States, 348 U.S. 147, 153-156(1954). In Smith, the
Court was well-aware of the problem of false confessions. See id. at 153. Yet, it adopted
the trustworthiness approach, rather than the corpus delicti rule, as the method for
determining the reliability and admissibility of a confession. See id. at 153, 156.
Besides better ensuring the reliability of a confession, the trustworthiness approach
also increases the factfinder's ability to ascertain truth by allowing a reliable confession to
be admitted, even when independent evidence of a crime is lacking. Defendant claims
5

that only a "remote" possibility exists that a case may arise in which "some evidence
corroborates a confession but the State does not have enough evidence to show that a
crime actually occurred." Br. of Resp. at 24-25. This case, however, demonstrates that
such cases do arise. It is undisputed that defendant's confession was truthful and
voluntary. Yet, under the corpus delicti rule, the State cannot prosecute defendant for a
crime he admits having committed. See State v. Mauchley, 2001 UT App 177, %l.
It is not difficult to conceive of future cases where the corpus delicti rule will
continue to hinder the fact finder's ability to ascertain truth. For example, although a
defendant may truthfully and voluntarily confess to sexually abusing a child, the corpus
delicti rule would prevent the fact finder from hearing the confession if no physical
evidence of the abuse existed and the victim was either too young or too scared to testify.
See State v. Ray, 926 P.2d 904 (Wash. 1996). Likewise, the fact finder would not hear
the truthful and voluntary confession of a murderer who smothers a newborn baby if the
medical examiner could not rule out the possibility that the death may have resulted from
natural causes. See State v. Johnson, 83 P.2d 1010, 1014-18, 1016 (Utah 1943). Thus,
there is a significant likelihood that the corpus delicti rule will continue to thwart the
truthfinding purpose of criminal trials by preventing the trier of fact from considering a
trustworthy and voluntary confession. See Ray, 926 P.2d at 910-11 (Talmadge, J.,
dissenting). The trustworthiness approach avoids this result. See id.

6

III.

THE TRUSTWORTHINESS STANDARD IS CLEAR AND
EASILY APPLIED

Defendant complains that the trustworthiness standard is vague because it does not
define "how much and what kind of evidence is needed to satisfy its requirements." Br.
of Resp. at 25 (internal quotations and citation omitted). On the contrary, the United
States Supreme Court has clearly defined the standard. See Opper, 348 U.S. at 93. The
kind of evidence needed to satisfy the standard is evidence that corroborates the essential
facts of the confession. Id. The amount of corroborative evidence required is
"substantial" evidence "sufficient[] to justify a jury inference" that the essential facts of
the confession are true. Id. The independent evidence need not corroborate each material
element of the charged offense, nor is it necessary that there be no inconsistencies
whatsoever between the independent evidence and the confession. Fontenot v. State, 881
P.2d 69, 79 (Okla Crim. App. 1994). "Unless inconsistencies between the confession and
the other evidence so overwhelm the similarities that the confession is rendered
untrustworthy, it remains within the province of the jury to determine whether the
confession is credible." Id.
This Court is familiar with the trustworthiness standard and has readily applied it
in determining the admissibility of a defendant's confession. For example, in State v.
Decorso, 1999 UT 57, f 78, 993 P.2d 837, this Court held that the defendant's confession
to a fellow inmate was "sufficiently corroborated to make it reliable" and therefore
admissible. In Decorso, the independent evidence corroborated defendant's confession
that he had robbed a shoe store, struggled with the clerk, taped her mouth shut, hit her in
7

the mouth with the butt of a gun, broke her teeth, and murdered her by stabbing her
several times in the neck and chest. Id. at ffi[76-78. The defendant argued that certain
aspects of his confession were not corroborated by independent evidence, specifically, his
admissions that he did not go to work after the murder, and that he raped the victim. Id.
at H 77. Nevertheless, this Court held that the confession was reliable because it was
"sufficiently corroborated." Id. at 78. Thus, as this Court demonstrated in Decorso, the
trustworthiness standard is not vague or difficult to apply.
IV.

DEFENDANT'S CONFESSION WAS TRUSTWORTHY

Defendant complains that there is a "total lack" of evidence corroborating his
confession. Br. of Resp. at 26. On the contrary, the independent evidence corroborated
every detail of defendant's confession, except for the fact that a crime had been
committed. R. 37-38.
Defendant states that "all the evidence, excluding the confession," indicates that
his insurance claim was valid. Br. of Resp. at 27. Thus, defendant essentially claims that
his confession was not trustworthy because the State failed to produce independent,
corroborating evidence that he committed insurance fraud by submitting a fraudulent
claim. The State does not dispute that it lacks independent evidence that defendant's
insurance claim was fraudulent. If such independent evidence existed, the State could
have satisfied the corpus delicti rule. See Johnson, 821 P.2d at 1162.
Under the trustworthiness standard, however, the independent evidence need not
be sufficient to establish the corpus delicti of the underlying crime. Opper, 348 U.S. at
8

93. In this case, the independent evidence corroborated defendant's confession that he
and his wife obtained an insurance settlement by claiming that they had fallen into a hole
outside the FHP hospital in South Salt Lake. R. 37-38. Defendant fails to identify any
inconsistency between his confession and the independent evidence. Therefore,
defendant's confession was trustworthy and admissible under the trustworthiness
standard.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, and those explained in the State's opening brief, this
Court should adopt the trustworthiness standard, reverse the court of appeals, and affirm
defendant's conviction.
Respectfully submitted this <v

day of July 2002.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Attorney General

CHRISTOPHER D. BALLARD
Assistant Attorney General
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